Hurricane Katrina displaced approximately 650,000 people and destroyed or severely damaged 217,000 homes along the Gulf Coast. Damage was especially severe in New Orleans, and the return of displaced residents to this city has been slow. The fraction of households receiving mail (which, in the absence of reliable population estimates, is a good indicator for returns) was 49.5 percent in August 2006 , and 66.0 percent in June 2007 (Greater New Orleans Community Data Center, 2007 . Low-income minority families appear to have been slower than others to return (William H. Frey and Audrey Singer, 2006) .
In this paper, we examine the determinants of returning to New Orleans in the 18 months after the hurricane. The data come from a study of low-income parents-mainly African American women-who were enrolled in a community college intervention prior to the hurricane. Although the sample is not representative of the pre-Katrina population of the city, it nonetheless is of great interest. The relatively slow return of low income, primarily African American, residents is a politically charged issue. One (extreme) view is that the redevelopment plans are designed to discourage low-income minority residents from returning. A quite different view is that members of this group have found better opportunities outside of New Orleans, and do not want to return. Because few data sets trace individuals from before to after the hurricane, this debate has taken place largely without the benefit of evidence.
I. Theoretical Framework
We present a simple model of the return decision that is used to motivate the empirical work that follows. Individuals' utility is assumed to be a function of their level of income, , and their stock of location-specific capital, C . Location-specific capital is defined as aspects of homes, communities, and networks of friends that are not easily replaced in other cities, at least in the y short run. Note that location-specific capital does not include financial assets or easily-replaced personal property. Losses in these assets produced by the hurricane are sunk costs that should not affect the location decision. Location-specific capital (and losses of this type of capital) can, in contrast, affect the value of living in one location relative to another.
An individual who lives in New Orleans receives income and has a location-specific capital level of C . If she were to leave New Orleans, she would receive an income of and have a location-specific capital level of zero. values of λ . In the extreme, if λ is equal to 1, location-specific capital afte he hurricane wi equal 0 and location decisions will be made solely on the basis of relative incomes.
II. Empirical Analyses r t ll
Sample m mbers were participants in an on-going study of low-income parents who had enrolled in two community colleges in th Ci were significantly less likely than others to be black, and more likely to have lived in the homes of friends or relatives or to have owned their own homes than to have been renters. There is a striking difference in the amount of flooding experienced between those who did and did not return: 23.9 percent of those who returned had positive levels of flooding four days after the hurricane struck, compared to 58.7 percent of those who did not return. greater pre-hurricane levels of location-specific capital. Our primary measure of hurricane damage exposure ( λ ) is an indicator of whether the water depth was positive. We use four measures of location-specific capital, all of which were measured prior to the hurricane. The first is an indicator for whether the respondent owned her own home, and the second is whether she lived with friends or relatives. If housing markets function perfectly, homeownership per se
should not be a measure of location-specific capital. However, this seems unlikely to be the case.
In addition, home owners may be more likely to be attached to neighborhoods than renters.
Living with friends or relatives may also indicate that the respondent has social ties in New
Orleans. The third measure is an indicator of whether the respondent attended church frequently, which indicates the presence of a social network in New Orleans. The last measure is an 8-item social support scale that contains items such as "There are people I know will help me if I need it," (C.E. Cutrona and D. Russell, 1987) . Each item is coded on a 4-point scale, summed, and then converted from the final scale to a within-sample z-score. results. We also found that the return decision is based more on whether there was flooding than on the amount of flooding: in a regression that included both the indicator that water depth was positive and the water depth in feet, the coefficient on the water depth was small and insignificant. This may arise because actual water depths were imprecisely measured, or because even small amounts of standing water produced serious damage to homes and neighborhoods. Notes: Regressions include a male dummy, the number of months between the hurricane and interview, indicators that race is "other" or "missing," and (for co ***Significant at the 1-percent level; **the 5-percent level; *the 10-perce the lumn 3) water depth. nt level.
ere and not
Respondents with more children were less likely to return, possibly because schools w slow to reopen. African Americans were also less likely to return, even controlling for water depth. (Note that African Americans were more likely than others to have experienced flooding: 45.0 percent of blacks had positive flooding, relative to 25.0 percent of others.) Relative to renters, homeowners were nearly 18 percentage points more likely to return, and those living with relatives or friends were 9.6 percentage points more likely to return. However, the coefficients on "attended church frequently" and the social support scale are negative statistically significant. Nevertheless, the location-specific capital variables are jointly significant at the 3 percent level. damage ( λ ) and the location-specific capital variables. We examine this by estimating separate id and did n , shown i the last two columns. 
III. Discussion
The results shown above indicate that flood exposure is the single most important factor in determining the decision to return. Yet, 36 percent of those who experienced no flooding had n returned to the New Orleans area by the time of the follow-up survey. Among those who did experience flooding, those who did not own homes or lived in the hom s of relatives or friends were less likely to return. Those who attended church frequently were, somewhat surprisingly also less likely to return.
The framework developed above implies that the losses from the hurricane should be largest among those who experienced more hurricane damage. However, some evacuees may have been unaware, prior to the hurricane, that better economic and social opportunities w available in other locations. If so, the forced movement out of the city due to the hurricane could have resulted in welfare improvements.
We do not find evidence to support this idea. We divided individuals into four groups, 
